Fair Share, Social Efficiency and Endowment Inequality in a Principal-Agent Problem
We consider the class of contribution games, that has been widely studied in the experimental economics literature, in the context of a simple principal-agent problem. In this setting the contributions of agents produce an output for the principal who rewards the agents by granting them a share of the output (β). The objective is to find a mechanism that encourages all agents to make full contributions at minimum β. While a recent work shows that the Galbraith Mechanism (GM) can achieve this objective in both theoretical and experimental settings, in this paper, we generalize the GM by relaxing the assumption that players have equal endowments. Our preliminary findings show that, under the proportional allocation behavior, for sufficiently small β, there exists a SPNE with full contributions by all players and that the equilibrium is independent of the endowment inequality parameter. Moreover, allocation behavior that concentrates too much on rewarding the highest contributor (e.g. a ‘winner-takes-all’ allocation) may not support a full contribution equilibrium.
Shravan Luckraz 教授，2020年2月加入浙江财经大学财政税务学院。2005年，从新加坡国立大学获得经济学博士学位后，在新加坡、澳大利亚和中国担任学术职务。主要研究方向为博弈论和数理经济学。他在国际重要经济学杂志发表论文多篇并主持国家自然科学基金国际青年项目两项。他曾获中国国家科学基金会国际青年科学家奖，并为美国数学学会的数学评论作出贡献。最近，他作为客座主编为《The Annuals of Dynamic Games》系列主编的书《Frontiers in Games and Dynamic Games》即将问世。
Professor Luckraz joined the School of Public Finance and Taxation of ZUFE in 2020. He earned his Ph.D. in Economics from the National University of Singapore in 2005 and since then, he has held academic positons in Singapore, Australia and China. His research interests are in the areas of Game Theory and Mathematical Economics. He has published in the leading journals of his field and has been the recipient of two major NSFC research grants. He was awarded the International Young Scientist Fellowship from the National Science Foundation of China and has contributed to Mathematical Reviews of the American Mathematical Society. He recently edited the latest volume of the Annals of Dynamic Games, entitled “Frontiers in Games and Dynamic Games”.