题目：Decentralization and political career concerns

作者：Colin Jiahua Che , Kim-Sau Chung , Yang K. Lu

报告人:张朝阳 博士 张子楠 博士

科研助理：孙佩瑶

时间：2017年4月20日13:30—15:00

地点：浙江财经大学财税学院1号楼302室

主办单位：浙江财经大学财政税务学院

文献信息：Colin Jiahua Che , Kim-Sau Chung , Yang K. Lu , "Decentralization and political career concerns ", Journal of Public Economics 145 (2017) 201–210.

内容摘要：Politicians’ career paths often start at some subnational governments and end at the national one. Allocation of authorities among national and subnational governments affects how tempting the prospects of taking national offices are, and hence how strong bureaucrats’ political career concerns are, and whether the incentives generated by these political career concerns can be put into productive use at subnational governments. We illustrate this tradeoff in determining the optimal degree of decentralization using China as a case study. We also compare the equilibrium degree of decentralization in autocracy and in democracy.

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